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In	 2003,	 amid	 the	 turmoil	 of	 the	U.S.	 airline	 industry	 in	 the	 post-9/11	 environment,	 the	 senior	
management	of	the	Alaska	Air	Group	announced	a	“strategic	vision”	entitled	“Alaska	2010.”	The	
pronouncement	articulated	positions	with	 regard	 to	 cost	 leadership,	product	differentiation,	and	
growth.	This	study	empirically	assesses	the	efficacy	of	this	decision	with	regard	to	the	major	network	
carrier	of	 the	air	group,	Alaska	Airlines.	The	analysis	 focuses	on	 the	period	beginning	with	 the	
announcement	and	ending	in	2010.
The	 implementation	 of	 such	 a	 strategic	 protocol	 is	 dynamic	 and	 inter-temporal	 in	 nature.	
Therefore,	it	is	often	difficult	to	assess	the	effectiveness	of	changes	in	strategies,	particularly	since	
such	effectiveness	is	often	a	function	of	the	confounding	forces	of	organizational	strategy	and	market	
conditions.	Thus,	this	study	utilizes	the	multi-period	methodology	of	the	strategic	variance	analysis	
of	operating	income.
This	methodology	decomposes	operating	income	into	three	components:	(1)	growth,	(2)	price	
recovery,	and	(3)	productivity.	This	is	of	particular	interest	from	a	strategic	planning	perspective,	as	
the	price	component	evaluates	a	company’s	product	differentiation	strategy	while	the	productivity	
component	evaluates	whether	an	airline’s	 low	cost	 strategy	was	successful	because	of	efficiency	
gains.	
INTRODUCTION
In 2003, the U.S. airline industry was in turmoil. Airline traffic continued to be below 2001 levels, 
still reeling from the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. A slow U.S. economy combined with 
rising fuel costs produced billions of dollars in losses for airlines. In addition, both US Airways and 
United Airlines filed for bankruptcy protection in 2002. In such a challenging business environment, 
it was clear that airlines had to change their operating strategies.
The management of Alaska Air Group, led by Chairman, President, and CEO William S. Ayer, 
did just that, announcing a “strategic vision” called “Alaska 2010.”  The plan was communicated to 
employees in June 2003, and elements of the plan were made public in the company’s annual report 
to shareholders for the year ended December 31, 2003, as well as in subsequent years. Highlights 
of the plan included a goal of making permanent cost reductions to save the company $307 million 
per year, and to drive down the non-fuel unit cost to 7.25 cents per available seat mile (Ayer 2004). 
In the letter to shareholders, Ayer stated, “Our task is to make the critical changes necessary to 
transform ourselves into a thriving enterprise.”
Alaska Air Group consists of two airlines: Alaska Airlines and Horizon Air Industries. As 
explained in the annual report to shareholders, the “business plans, competition, and economic risks 
differ substantially” (SEC 2004). The focus of this research is on the impact of the Alaska 2010 
strategic plan on Alaska Airlines, since it is the major network carrier in the group.
From a research perspective, questions arose as to how Alaska Airlines was performing relative 
to other airlines. It was also asked if management was correct in perceiving a need to transform the 
company’s operations. After all, by its own perception, the company was doing very well relative 
to the industry. In 2001, the company reported that “Alaska [Airlines] posted remarkable results 
following the 9/11 tragedy. For instance, industry traffic was down 19% in the fourth quarter, and 
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Alaska’s was only down 5.6%. Likewise, yield per revenue passenger mile and unit revenues were 
down 17% and 20% respectively for the major carriers combined, while Alaska’s were down only 
7.3% and 5.5%.” (Kelly 2002). Similarly, in 2002, the company stated that “Alaska [Airlines] had 
the best traffic, revenue, and yield performance of the majors.” (Kelly 2003). Nonetheless, the 
company was losing money.
This paper assesses the Alaska 2010 strategic transformation using strategic variance analysis 
(SVA). SVA is used to analyze a company’s profitability by breaking it down into strategic 
components, namely, cost leadership, product differentiation, and growth (Horngren et al. 2000, 
2006, 2012). Sopariwala (2003) extended the analysis to include a fourth component, capacity 
underutilization. SVA has been used by Mudde and Sopariwala (2008) and Bailey et al. (2009) to 
analyze a given airline’s profitability, and by Caster and Scheraga (2011) to analyze the performance 
of all U.S. network carriers.
THE ALASKA AIR GROUP LONG-TERM STRATEGIC PLAN
In discussing “Alaska 2010,” the Alaska Air Group long-term strategic plan, Ayer noted that the 
company’s goal for the future was “a combination of ideas that generate savings or increase revenue 
while enhancing our standing with customers” (Ayer 2004). Ayer stated that cost management was 
a significant challenge. He went on to explain why the plan was called “Alaska 2010.” He said that 
“if we make the right moves now, 2010 will be the year we look back with great pride at how we 
transformed ourselves - - how we took control and willed ourselves to be one of the preeminent 
airlines in the United States” (Ayer 2004).
Additional details of the strategic plan emerged in the annual report to shareholders for calendar 
year 2004. In the letter to shareholders dated April 11, 2005, Ayer (2005) explained that permanent 
reductions in annual costs of $185 million had been achieved. This reduction was accomplished 
in part through a fuel hedging program, in addition to savings achieved through a “top-to-bottom 
review of our supply chain.” Cost savings were also achieved by streamlining the fare structure, 
by improving the website for the purchase of fares online, and by improving turn times of aircraft 
between flights. Ayer acknowledged that competitors were improving their cost structures at an even 
faster pace than Alaska Air Group, and to that end, it was necessary to reduce the workforce, in part 
by outsourcing some of its maintenance operations. Ayer (2005) also reported that “a big part of 
our Alaska 2010 plan focuses on achieving competitive labor costs for all major work groups.” The 
company estimated that wages and benefits were approximately $125 million above market, with 
most of that amount due to pilots.
Although some details of the strategic plan are disclosed in the annual reports, the information 
does not provide a complete picture. In fact, only those details that management chooses to 
disclose are available. Strategic variance analysis provides a better means for analysis of Alaska’s 
performance. It provides an independent lens through which to view and analyze that performance. 
In addition, it allows for benchmarking with peer companies, in this case, the other network carriers. 
The following two sections provide a description of strategic variance analysis and the details on 
calculation and interpretation of the variances.
STRATEGIC VARIANCE ANALYSIS
SVA was introduced by Shank and Govindarajan (1993) as a management tool that combined the 
then rising field of business strategy to traditional profit variance analysis in cost accounting. SVA, 
as modified by Sopariwala (2003), takes a company’s profit (or loss) and breaks it down into four 
components: growth, price-recovery, productivity, and capacity underutilization. Each component 
is discussed in greater detail in the following section of the paper. Variances are defined as the 
differences between actual results and expected results, and they are calculated for each component.
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Sopariwala (2003) based his version of SVA on Horngren et al. (2000). Horngren et al. (2012, 
478-485) illustrate how SVA can be used to analyze profitability “from one period to any future 
period.” Their illustration shows how to calculate and interpret the growth component, the price-
recovery component, and the productivity component. As discussed in Horngren et al. (2012), the 
price-recovery component is related to product differentiation and the productivity component is 
related to cost leadership.
Product differentiation and cost leadership are two of the three generic strategies developed 
by Porter (1980, 35) for “outperforming competitors in the industry.” His third strategy is “focus,” 
which involves specializing in a niche area of the market. Cost leadership means that a company is 
recognized throughout the industry as the low cost provider of goods or services. Porter states that it 
requires “a great deal of managerial attention to cost control.” (Porter 1980, 35).  According to Porter 
(1980, 37), product differentiation involves “creating something that is perceived industrywide as 
being unique. Having a unique product or service leads to brand loyalty, which allows a company 
to charge a higher price, thereby outperforming others in the industry without having low costs as 
a primary objective. Horngren et al. (2012) refer to this as price-recovery, because the company is 
able to recover its higher costs through higher revenues, thus earning a decent return.
Porter’s third strategy is similar to the other two, in that a company chooses to follow a low 
cost strategy or a product differentiation strategy, but it does so in a narrow niche of the market. 
Therefore, the focus strategy is not an industry-wide strategy.
Porter then goes on to describe companies that are “stuck in the middle.”  It is possible that 
Alaska Air Group perceived itself in 2003 as a company that could be “stuck in the middle.” A 
company that is stuck in the middle “lacks the market share, capital investment, and resolve to 
play the low-cost game, the industry-wide differentiation necessary to obviate the need for a low-
cost position, or the focus to create differentiation or a low-cost position in a more limited sphere” 
(Porter 1980, 41).
SVA is an ideal technique for assessing the success or failure of a long-term strategic plan, such 
as Alaska 2010. Management of Alaska Airlines measures its success by looking at profitability, 
goals for reducing its cost structure, and customer satisfaction. But the acid test is how Alaska 
Airlines has performed relative to its peers. SVA provides easy comparisons between Alaska Airlines 
and the rest of the U.S. network carriers.
DEVELOPMENT OF VARIANCES
The variances used for SVA are calculated based on Sopariwala (2003), using the four components 
of a company’s performance as described in Mudde and Sopariwala (2008). Each component, and 
the variances associated with that component, is explained as follows:
Growth Component
The growth component measures the change in operating income due to a change in revenue 
passenger miles (RPMs). Four separate variances are calculated related to changes in RPMs. The 
revenue effect of growth captures the change in revenues due to a change in RPMs, holding air fares 
(revenue per RPM) constant. As explained in Mudde and Sopariwala (2008, 25), it would show 
“higher expected revenue due to higher RPMs.”
The other three variances relate to costs and expenses, namely, fuel costs, flight-related costs, 
and passenger-related costs.  Mudde and Sopariwala (2008) base the cost drivers on Banker and 
Johnston (2003), who suggested volume-based and non-volume-based cost drivers appropriate for 
the airline industry. The fuel cost effect of growth is calculated using available seat miles (ASMs) 
as the cost driver, while holding the price of fuel constant. The variance is calculated based on 
budgeted ASMs compared with actual ASMs. Thus, an airline would experience higher fuel costs 
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and a corresponding decline in operating profit if it experienced growth in the market that exceeded 
expectations, while holding the price per gallon of jet fuel constant to isolate the impact of growth. 
In a similar manner, expectations and variances are developed for the growth effect of flight-related 
and passenger-related costs, while holding all else equal.
Price-Recovery Component
The price-recovery component measures the change in operating income due to changes in the 
prices of inputs and outputs, holding all else equal. Four separate variances are calculated related to 
changing prices. The revenue effect of price-recovery captures the change in airfares, holding RPMs 
constant. The other three variances relate to the cost of inputs, namely, fuel costs, flight-related 
costs other than fuel, and passenger-related costs. For example, if the cost of jet fuel increases in 
the current period, operating profit would decline, holding gallons of fuel used and budgeted ASMs 
constant.
Productivity Component
The productivity component measures the change in operating income due to changes in the use 
of inputs, holding all else equal. Productivity is measured in terms of fuel usage efficiencies and 
passenger cost related efficiencies, as calculated by Mudde and Sopariwala (2008). Three variances 
are calculated, two of which are related to fuel usage. The first fuel usage efficiency variance 
measures fuel usage per gallon, holding the cost per gallon and budgeted ASMs constant. Gallons 
used per ASM in the previous period are the expectation for the current period, and the variance is 
then based on actual gallons used per ASM in the current period. The passenger load factor also has 
an impact on fuel usage, so a second fuel usage variance is calculated by holding the price per gallon 
constant and the gallons used per ASM constant, while comparing budgeted ASMs to actual ASMs 
in the current period. The third variance is calculated based on the difference between budgeted 
revenue passengers and actual revenue passengers served, while holding the cost per passenger 
constant. The variance is favorable, and thus operating profit would increase if an airline achieves 
the same RPMs while carrying fewer passengers, and hence the cost associated with that would 
decrease.
Capacity Underutilization Component
The capacity underutilization component measures the change in operating income due to changes 
in capacity, holding all else equal. Three variances are calculated, each of which involves the impact 
on flight-related costs (excluding fuel costs). The first variance is the cost of acquiring additional 
capacity that goes unused in the current period. The variance is calculated by subtracting actual 
RPMs in the current period from actual ASMs in the current period. The second variance is the cost 
of underutilization of available capacity. The variance is simply the change in actual ASMs over the 
period under study, holding the cost per ASM constant. The third variance measures the impact of a 
change in capacity actually used. The variance is simply the change in RPMs over the period under 
study, holding the cost per ASM constant.
THE DATA SET  
Data were obtained from two sources: The International Civil Aviation Organization, Financial	
Data:	Commercial	Air	Carriers,	Series	F and Traffic:	Commercial	Air	Carriers,	Series	T, and from 
the U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Transtats	 Aviation	
Database. We chose three, three-year time periods for the analysis, 2001 to 2003, 2004 to 2006, 
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and 2007 to 2009. We also examine the one-year period from 2009 to 2010 to include the last year 
of Alaska’s strategic plan. The three-year time frame is consistent with the work of Caster and 
Scheraga (2011).
Alaska Airlines is a U.S. network air carrier, as classified by the Department of Transportation, 
therefore, we collected data on the other network air carriers for benchmarking purposes. In the 
first two three-year time periods, we construct a composite based on the seven network carriers: 
Alaska, American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, United, and US Airways. In the last three-year 
time period, US Airways was dropped from the analysis due to its merger with America West, which 
would make the data non-comparable to the earlier periods.
RESULTS OF THE STRATEGIC VARIANCE ANALYSIS
Table 1 provides the financial data for Alaska Airlines. It is interesting to note, just from the raw 
data, that operating profit changed dramatically during the period. For the year ended December 
31, 2000, Alaska Airlines reported a net operating loss of $12,375,000. The annual operating loss 
grew to $103,629,000 for the year ended December 31, 2006. But three years later, they reported an 
annual net operating profit of $208,421,000.
Table 1: Alaska Airlines – Financial Data ($)
2000 2003 2006 2009
Operating revenues 1,759,867,000 2,027,376,000 2,692,507,000 3,005,999,000
Operating expenses 1,772,242,000 2,037,996,000 2,796,136,000 2,797,578,000
Flying operations 662,612,000 737,423,000 1,141,147,000 1,014,188,000
Maintenance 204,115,000 244,001,000 269,370,000 293,567,000
Depreciation and 
amortization 83,860,000 119,467,000 137,811,000 178,488,000
User charges 35,185,000 57,771,000 51,976,000 54,161,000
Station expenses 266,623,000 346,011,000 393,344,000 369,387,000
Aircraft and traffic servicing 301,808,000 403,782,000 445,320,000 423,548,000
Passenger services 155,622,000 200,381,000 207,062,000 211,298,000
Promotion and sales 248,499,000 218,672,000 209,078,000 176,864,000
General & Administrative 104,851,000 103,267,000 364,515,000 216,133,000
Transport related expenses 10,875,000 11,003,000 21,833,000 283,492,000
Operating profit -12,375,000 -10,620,000 -103,629,000 208,421,000
Data Source: International Civil Aviation Organization, Financial	Data:	Commercial	Air	Carriers,	Series	F, 
Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009 
Table 2 provides the operating data and Table 3 provides the fuel data for Alaska Airlines 
needed to perform the strategic variance analysis. Table 4 reclassifies the operating data to show fuel 
costs, flight-related costs less fuel costs, and passenger-related costs, the three cost drivers used in 
prior studies (e.g., Caster and Scheraga 2011, Mudde and Sopariwala 2008). Table 5 uses the data 
from Tables 2, 3, and 4 to calculate the data needed for strategic variance analysis of Alaska Airlines.
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Table 2: Alaska Airlines – Operational Data
2000 2003 2006 2009
Revenue passengers 13,512,111 15,046,919 17,148,313 15,523,498
Revenue passenger miles 11,976,022,528 14,553,539,641 17,810,371,493 18,315,689,560
Available seat miles 17,291,684,686 20,803,557,288 23,257,684,435 23,070,335,242
Data Source: International Civil Aviation Organization, Traffic:	Commercial	Air	Carriers,	Series	T, Montreal, 
Quebec, Canada, 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009
Table 3: Alaska Airlines – Fuel Data
2000 2003 2006 2009
Total gallons used 302,437,826 336,686,178 353,844,599 303,896,417
Total fuel costs 286,073,111 296,732,291 716,950,639 529,385,990
Average fuel cost per gallon ($) 0.95 0.88 2.03 1.74
Data Source: U. S. Department of Transportation, Research and Innovative Administration, Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics, TranStats	Database, Washington, D.C., 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009
Table 4: Alaska Airlines – Reclassified Financial Data ($)
2000 2003 2006 2009
Total operating revenues 1,759,867,000 2,027,376,000 2,692,507,000 3,005,999,000
Less: Total operating expenses 1,772,242,000 2,037,996,000 2,796,136,000 2,797,578,000
Fuel costs 286,073,111 296,732,291 716,950,639 529,385,990
Flight-related costs 935,861,889 1,118,809,709 1,424,787,361 1,667,780,010
Passenger-related costs 550,307,000 622,454,000 654,398,000 600,412,000
Operating income/(loss) -12,375,000 -10,620,000 -103,629,000 208,421,000
2000 2003 2006 2009
Flying operations 662,612,000 737,423,000 1,141,147,000 1,014,188,000
Less: Fuel Cost 286,073,111 296,732,291 716,950,639 529,385,990
Flying operations 
(excluding fuel cost) 376,538,889 440,690,709 424,196,361 484,802,010
Maintenance 204,115,000 244,001,000 269,370,000 293,567,000
Passenger service 155,622,000 200,381,000 207,062,000 211,298,000
General and administrative 104,851,000 103,267,000 364,515,000 216,133,000
Depreciation and amortization 83,860,000 119,467,000 137,811,000 178,488,000
Transport related 10,875,000 11,003,000 21,833,000 283,492,000
Total flight-related costs 935,861,889 1,118,809,709 1,424,787,361 1,667,780,010
2000 2003 2006 2009
Aircraft and traffic servicing 301,808,000 403,782,000 445,320,000 423,548,000
Promotion and sales 248,499,000 218,672,000 209,078,000 176,864,000
Total passenger-related costs 550,307,000 622,454,000 654,398,000 600,412,000
Data Sources: 1) Data Source: International Civil Aviation Organization, Financial	Data:	Commercial	Air	
Carriers,	Series	F, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 2003, 2006, and 2009 and 2) U. S. Department of Transportation, 
Research and Innovative Administration, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, TranStats	Database, Washington, 
D. C., 2003, 2006, and 2009
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Table 5: Alaska Airlines – Data Used in Strategic Variance Analysis1
2000 2003 2006 2009
Total operating revenues ($) 1,759,867,000 2,027,376,000 2,692,507,000 3,005,999,000
Revenue passenger miles (RPMs) 11,986,220,472 14,553,539,641 17,822,404,781 18,361,670,904
Average revenue per RPM 0.147 0.139 0.151 0.164
Revenue passenger miles (RPMs) 11,986,220,472 14,553,539,641 17,822,404,781 18,361,670,904
Available seat miles (ASMs) 17,314,311,918 20,803,557,288 23,275,770,873 23,144,012,157
Passenger load factor (%) 69.23% 69.96% 76.57% 79.34%
Hence, budgeted available seat miles 21,022,850,818 25,476,236,573 23,980,043,662
Revenue passenger miles (RPMs) 11,986,220,472 14,553,539,641 17,822,404,781 18,361,670,904
Revenue passenger enplanements 13,524,685 15,046,919 17,164,501 15,561,087
Average revenue passenger miles per 
passenger ($) 886.25 967.21 1038.33 1179.97
Hence, budgeted revenue passenger 
enplanements 16,421,527 18,426,602 17,683,860
Number of gallons used 302,437,826 336,686,178 353,844,599 303,896,417
Available seat miles (ASMs) 17,314,311,918 20,803,557,288 23,275,770,873 23,144,012,157
Average number of gallons per ASM 0.0174675 0.0161841 0.0152023 0.0131307
Total flight-related costs ($) 935,861,889 1,118,809,709 1,424,787,361 1,667,780,010
Available seat miles (ASMs) 17,314,311,918 20,803,557,288 23,275,770,873 23,144,012,157
Average flight-related cost per ASM ($) 0.054 0.054 0.061 0.072
Total passenger-related costs ($) 550,307,000 622,454,000 654,398,000 600,412,000
Revenue passenger enplanements 13,524,685 15,046,919 17,164,501 15,561,087
Average cost per revenue passenger ($) 40.69 41.37 38.13 38.58
Revenue passenger (RPMs) 11,986,220,472 14,553,539,641 17,822,404,781 18,361,670,904
Available seat miles (ASMs) 17,314,311,918 20,803,557,288 23,275,770,873 23,144,012,157
Idle or unused capacity (ASMs) 5,328,091,446 6,250,017,647 5,453,366,092 4,782,341,252
Hence, budgeted idle capacity (ASMs) 6,469,311,177 7,653,831,792 5,618,372,758
Data Sources: 1) International Civil Aviation Organization, Financial	Data:	Commercial	Air	Carriers,	Series	F, Montreal, 
Quebec, Canada, 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009, 2) International Civil Aviation Organization, Traffic:	Commercial	Air	Carriers,	
Series	T, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009, and 3) U. S. Department of Transportation, Research and 
Innovative Administration, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, TranStats	Database, Washington, D. C., 2000, 2003, 2006, 
and 2009
1Budgeted Available Seat Miles from year x to year y = Revenue Passenger Miles (year y) / Passenger Load Factor (year x), 
Budgeted Revenue Passengers Enplanements from year x to year y = Revenue Passenger Miles (year y) / Average Revenue 
Passenger Miles per Passenger (year x), and Budgeted Idle Capacity in year y = Budgeted Available Seat Miles (year y) – 
Revenue Passenger Miles (year y). [See Mudde and Sopariwala (2008).]
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Table 6a provides the strategic variance analysis for Alaska Airlines and six other network 
carriers for the three-year time frame ending December 31, 2003. The first column shows the results 
for Alaska Airlines, and the last column is a composite of all of network carriers in the sample. 
The annual net operating loss in 2003 was $10.6 million, an improvement of approximately $1.8 
million compared with 2000 (Table 1). Strategic variance analysis provides a breakdown of the 
change in annual operating profitability. Alaska Airlines achieved productivity gains of nearly 
$84 million. More than half of the gain is from passenger-related costs, i.e., lower costs due to 
flying more miles per passenger. The growth component contributed approximately $59 million 
to increased profitability. All of that increase is due to the revenue effect of growth, meaning that 
Alaska Airlines had higher RPMs in 2003 than in 2000. In contrast, the price-recovery component 
showed a large decrease of approximately $93 million. Nearly all of that decrease is due to the 
revenue effects, meaning that Alaska Airlines charged lower airfares in 2003 than in 2000. The 
capacity underutilization component shows a decrease of more than $48 million. A large increase 
in ASMs led to a $190 million decrease in operating profits due to underutilization of available 
capacity. However, by increasing its RPMs in the period, Alaska enjoyed a $139.5 million increase 
in operating profits due to the capacity it actually used.
Table 6b provides the strategic variance analysis for Alaska Airlines and six other network 
carriers for the three-year time frame ending December 31, 2006. The net operating loss increased 
by approximately $93 million compared with December 31, 2003 (Table 1). The strategic variance 
analysis reveals results very similar to the prior period. Alaska Airlines’ operating profits improved 
by almost $73 million due to the growth component, with all of that improvement attributable to 
the revenue effect of growth. Productivity gains were achieved from all three measures, amounting 
to an improvement of $166.2 million in annual operating profits. Capacity underutilization was 
not material in this period, although the pattern was similar to the prior period in terms of unused 
ASMs and RPMs actually flown. However, the decrease in profitability due to the price-recovery 
component of more than $334 million in the period overwhelmed the increases in the other three 
components. Although Alaska Airlines raised its fares in this time period, the revenue effect of fare 
increases was not sufficient to recover increased costs of fuel, primarily, and also other flight-related 
costs.
Table 6c provides the strategic variance analysis for Alaska Airlines and five other network 
carriers for the three-year time frame ending December 31, 2009. Alaska Airlines experienced 
dramatic improvement in its annual operating profits, going from a loss of $103.6 million to a 
profit of $208.4 million (Table 1). The first three components of the strategic variance analysis 
show positive impacts on annual operating profits. The growth component was much less of a 
factor than in the previous two periods, contributing just $6.5 million to increased profitability. 
Productivity gains were quite significant, contributing $186.2 million to increased profitability. 
Alaska Airlines was able to significantly reduce the amount of jet fuel used, resulting in a savings 
of approximately $85 million. It also had a savings of $81.7 million in passenger-related costs by 
flying more miles per passenger than in the earlier period. Perhaps most interesting is the $129.4 
million increase in annual operating profits due to the price-recovery component. The revenue 
effect of price-recovery shows that Alaska Airlines was able to charge higher fares, which helped 
to recover higher flight-related costs. They also achieved some cost savings in fuel costs during the 
period. Capacity underutilization was relatively insignificant during the period, with a decrease in 
operating profitability of approximately $10 million. The fact that management was able to increase 
profitability through higher airfares and through further gains in productivity shows that a blended 
strategy, as discussed in Caster and Scheraga (2011) was in use during this three-year period.
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Table 9 provides the strategic variance analysis for Alaska Airlines for the last year of the 
long-term strategic plan. Other network carriers are not included because the group changed yet 
again with the merger of Northwest Airlines into Delta. The analysis shows that Alaska experienced 
continued and significant growth in profitability due to growth in the market. In 2007, Alaska began 
adding service to Hawaii, and by 2010, that market represented 15% of its total network (Ayer 
2011).
The price-recovery component for 2010 shows a contribution to net operating profits of $49.5 
million, achieved primarily through higher airfares. Productivity gains contributed $68 million, 
primarily due to fuel cost savings and passenger-related savings. In addition, Alaska Airlines made 
much better use of capacity, achieving a gain in profitability of $69.3 million. According to Ayer 
(2010), Alaska reduced its capacity on routes with low demand while increasing capacity on routes 
with higher demand, particularly the routes to Hawaii.
On the surface, it would appear as if the Alaska 2010 strategic plan was a huge success. However, 
it is not sufficient to look at the performance of Alaska Airlines in a vacuum. Benchmarking against 
the other network air carriers is necessary to determine just how successful the plan has been. 
Tables 7a, 7b, and 7c provide rankings for the network carriers, after normalizing the data for size 
differences by dividing by RPMs. Alaska Airlines ranked first in the growth component in the 
earliest period, second in the middle period, and third in the last three-year period. This analysis 
shows that for most of the time, Alaska Airlines was among the leaders in increased market share as 
air travel recovered and grew after the tragedy of 9/11.
The price-recovery component directly corresponds to Porter’s (1980) product differentiation 
strategy. It is interesting to note that Alaska Airlines ranked first during the three years ending 
December 31, 2003, and December 31, 2009. But for the three years ending December 31, 2006, 
it ranked last. The productivity component directly corresponds to Porter’s (1980) cost leadership 
strategy. Alaska ranked second in the first two, three-year periods, and improved to a first place 
ranking in the third, three-year period. Its consistently high ranking on this component suggests 
that Alaska 2010 was focused primarily on cutting costs and becoming the low-cost leader in the 
industry. However, it is also evident that management is using a blended strategy, since it ranked 
first in price-recovery for two of the three periods.
Alaska Airlines ranked fifth and sixth over the nine years in terms of capacity underutilization. 
This suggests that managing capacity was not a major focus of the Alaska 2010 strategic plan, 
or, if it was, then the competition continues to do a better job than Alaska at managing capacity. 
Going forward, this also suggests that management may be able to increase future profitability by 
improving its use of capacity.
As shown in Tables 6a, 6b, and 6c, Alaska Airlines experienced increases in annual operating 
profits due to growth in the market. The growth component, however, is impacted by exogenous 
factors as well as endogenous factors. Horngren et al. (2012) provide an adjustment to the growth 
component to estimate how much of the growth component is due to management’s strategic 
decisions (endogenous factors). The estimate is based on the overall growth in the market, in this 
case, the composite figures for the network carriers. For example, if the market grew by 50%, then 
50% growth is assumed for Alaska Airlines. Any growth above and beyond 50% is assumed to be 
endogenous.
Table 8a shows that nearly 150% of Alaska’s growth is attributable to endogenous factors. 
Overall, the market actually decreased by more than 10% for the period, yet Alaska grew its market 
share by 21.42%. Similarly, management’s initiatives contributed 39.3% to Alaska’s growth in 
2006, as shown in Table 8b, and 352% in 2009, as shown in Table 8c. In 2009, the overall market 
decreased by 7.64%, yet Alaska grew its market by 3%. Thus, in all three periods, management’s 
strategic decisions had a positive impact on growth in the market. This result is consistent with 
Alaska’s high ranking on productivity, as companies that follow a low cost strategy tend to exhibit 
growth in market share.
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Table 8a: Impact of Endogenous Strategies - Growth Component  
 2001 (12/31/00) – 2003 (12/31/03)
RPMs 2001 RPMs 2003 %Δ2001-2003 ENDOGENOUS
Alaska 11,986,220,472.44 14,553,539,641.00 21.42 149.86%
American 116,546,866,300.80 120,299,948,301.92 3.22 431.68%
Continental 62,344,035,830.75 57,577,384,884.77 -7.65 39.61%
Delta 107,817,843,792.25 89,412,207,706.99 -17.07 -37.43%
Northwest 79,204,321,760.92 68,746,644,595.56 -13.20 -19.09%
United 126,906,366,817.78 104,371,719,160.11 -17.76 -39.86%
US Airways 46,870,108,565.97 37,774,319,225.72 -19.41 -44.98%
Composite 551,675,763,540.92 492,735,763,516.07 -10.68
Endogenous Effect = [%ΔRPMs(2001-2003)Airline i - %ΔRPMs(2001-2003)Market] / |%ΔRPMs(2001-2003)Airline i|
Table 8b: Impact of Endogenous Strategies - Growth Component
 2004 (12/31/03) – 2006 (12/31/06)
RPMs 2004 RPMs 2006 %Δ2004-2006 ENDOGENOUS
Alaska 14,553,539,641 17,822,404,781 22.46 39.31%
American 120,299,948,302 139,420,782,629 15.89 14.22%
Continental 57,577,384,885 76,302,518,293 32.52 58.09%
Delta 89,412,207,707 98,887,497,017 10.60 -28.58%
Northwest 68,746,644,596 72,674,331,902 5.71 -138.70%
United 104,371,719,160 117,445,990,416 12.53 -8.78%
US Airways 37,774,319,226 37,357,913,286 -1.10 -1339.09%
Composite 492,735,763,516 559,911,438,325 13.63
Endogenous Effect = [%ΔRPMs(2004-2006)Airline i - %ΔRPMs(2004-2006)Market] / |%ΔRPMs(2004-2006)Airline i|
Table 8c: Impact of Endogenous Strategies - Growth Component
 2006 (12/31/06) – 2009 (12/31/09)
RPMs 2006 RPMs 2009 %Δ2006-2009 ENDOGENOUS
Alaska 17,822,404,781 18,361,670,904 3.03 352.15%
American 139,420,782,629 122,391,483,735 -12.21 -37.43%
Continental 76,302,518,293 77,768,332,936 1.92 497.92%
Delta 98,887,497,017 100,711,842,838 1.84 515.22%
Northwest 72,674,331,902 62,941,173,546 -13.39 -42.94%
United 117,445,990,416 100,453,973,793 -14.47 -47.23%
Composite 522,553,525,039 482,628,477,752 -7.64
Endogenous Effect = [%ΔRPMs(2006-2009)Airline i - %ΔRPMs(2006-2009)Market] / |%ΔRPMs(2006-2009)Airline i|
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Table 9: Strategic Variance Analysis Alaska Airlines 2009-2010
    Alaska NormalizedAlaska
GROWTH COMPONENT 2009-2010
 Revenue effect 326,586,654 16,083,578
 Fuel cost effect -57,515,122 -2,832,476
 Flight-related cost effect -143,852,606 -7,084,382
 Passenger-related effect -65,231,740 -3,212,500
TOTAL 59,987,186 2,954,219
PRICE-RECOVERY COMPONENT 2009-2010 
 Revenue effect 94,039,346 4,631,203
 Fuel cost effect -163,054,470 -8,030,026
 Flight-related cost effect 96,567,740 4,755,720
 Passenger-related effect 21,979,726 1,082,447
TOTAL 49,532,341 2,439,344
 PRODUCTIVITY COMPONENT 2009-2010 
 Fuel cost effect 5,392,354 265,560
 Fuel (ASM) cost effect 35,155,480 1,731,320
 Passenger-related effect 27,478,015 1,353,224
TOTAL 68,025,849 3,350,103
CAPACITY UNDERUTILIZATION COMPONENT 2009-2010 
 Unused capacities 19,325,217 951,719
 Available capacities -93,894,199 -4,624,055
 Used capacities 143,852,606 7,084,382
TOTAL 69,283,624 3,412,046
Alaska Airlines
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THE INTERACTION BETWEEM ALASKA AND HORIZON AIR INDUSTRIES AND 
THE IMPACT ON SVA RESULTS
Although the focus of this research is Alaska Airlines, the Alaska 2010 initiative impacted both 
airlines in the group, Alaska Airlines and Horizon Air Industries. During the period of this study, 
it is possible that Alaska Airlines shifted routes, frequencies of flights, and aircraft to its regional 
affiliate, Horizon Air Industries. If this occurred to a significant degree, then there might be an 
important impact in terms of the underlying drivers of the results of the strategic variance analysis.
ASMs and RPMs by aircraft type for both carriers were examined to try and detect route 
interactions between the two airlines. Conceptually, if such an interaction were of significant 
magnitude, then one would see a larger share of ASMs and RPMs being flown by the aircraft types 
of the regional affiliate airline. Table 10 shows virtually no change in ASMs and RPMs by aircraft 
types flown by Alaska Airlines versus those flown by Horizon Air Industries for the years ending 
in 2003, 2006, and 2009 (the end points of each of the periods used in the SVA analysis). Instead, 
Alaska Airlines phased out its usage of McDonnell Douglas aircraft in favor of more efficient ones 
from the single Boeing 737 family. Horizon Air Industries phased out its Fokker and De Havilland 
DHC8-200Q Dash-8 airplanes in favor of the more efficient De Havilland DHC8-400 Dash-8 
aircraft.
In addition, the annual reports of the Alaska Air Group were examined for each year in the 
study. Typically, in the letter to shareholders, the CEO discusses progress made in the strategic plan 
for the preceding year. In only one year, 2007, was there any mention of a shift in service between 
the two airlines. In that year, Alaska Airlines contracted with Horizon Air Industries for the use of 
some 70-seat Canadair RJ-700 aircraft for certain routes for which Alaska’s Boeing 737 jets were 
too large to be profitable. Thus, it appears that for the entire period of the study, any interaction 
effects were minimal.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In 2003, Alaska Air Group embarked on a long-term strategic plan to transform the company. 
Management referred to the plan in annual reports to stockholders in 2003 and in subsequent years, 
marking their successes and further needs for improvement. In fact, the plan appeared to be highly 
successful based on the 2010 annual report to stockholders. Strategic variance analysis provides a 
means to assess the plan and to categorize management’s efforts in terms of Porter’s (1980) long-
term strategies for business success. This paper examines Alaska Airlines’ performance in three-year 
time windows from 2001 to 2003, 2004 to 2006, and 2007 to 2009. In addition, we examine 2010, 
the last year of the strategic plan.
Strategic variance analysis shows that Alaska Airlines focused primarily on growing its share 
of the market and on productivity gains by cutting costs. In later years, they also followed a product 
differentiation strategy, raising air fares sufficiently to cover increased costs for such a strategy. 
Finally, they made changes in their routes to achieve greater profitability through better use of 
capacity.
The success of the plan may also be measured by comparison with the other network carriers. 
That analysis revealed that by 2009, Alaska ranked first in both productivity and price-recovery, as 
well as third in growth in market share. In sum, it appears that management delivered on its forecast 
in the 2003 annual report that 2010 would be a year where they could “look back with great pride at 
how we transformed ourselves” (Ayer 2004).
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APPENDIX
Calculation of Strategic Variances from Year i to Year j
The Growth Component
1. Airline Revenues
[Revenue effect of the Growth Component (i.e., lower expected revenue due to lower RPM)]
Variance = {Year i revenue/RPM} * {Year j RPMs – Year i RPMs}
2. Fuel Costs
[Fuel cost effect of the Growth Component (i.e., lower expected fuel costs due to lower RPMs)]
Variance = {Year i fuel cost/gallon} * {Year i gallons used per ASM} * {Year i actual ASMs – 
Year j budgeted ASMs}
3. Flight-related Costs
[Flight-related cost effect of the Growth Component (i.e., lower expected flight-related costs due 
to lower RPMs)]
Variance = {Year i cost/ASM} * {Year i passenger load factor} * {Year i actual ASMs – Year j 
budgeted ASMs}
4. Passenger-related Costs
[Passenger-related cost effect of the Growth Component (i.e., lower expected passenger-related 
costs due to lower RPMs)]
Variance = {Year i cost/passenger} * {Year i revenue passengers – Year j budgeted revenue 
passengers} 
The Price-Recovery Component
1. Airline Revenues
[Revenue effect of the Price-Recovery Component (i.e., higher revenue due to higher airfares)]
Variance = {Year j RPMs} * {Year j revenue/RPM – Year i revenue/RPM}
2. Fuel Costs
[Fuel cost effect of the Price-Recovery Component (i.e., higher costs due to higher fuel prices)]
Variance = {Year j budgeted ASMs} * {Year i gallons used/ASM} * {Year i fuel cost/gallon – 
Year j fuel cost/gallon}
3. Flight-related Costs
[Flight-related cost effect of the Price-Recovery Component (i.e., higher costs due to higher 
flight-related costs per ASM)]
Variance = {Year j passenger load factor} * {Year j actual ASMs} * {Year i cost/ASM – Year j 
cost/ASM}
4. Passenger-related Costs
[Passenger-related cost effect of the Price-Recovery Component (i.e., higher costs due to higher 
costs per passenger)]
Variance = {Year j budgeted revenue passengers} * {Year i cost/passenger – Year j cost/passenger}
 The Productivity Component
1. Fuel Costs (a)
[Fuel cost effect of the Productivity Component (i.e., lower costs due to lower fuel usage per 
gallon)]
Variance = {Year j fuel cost/gallon} * {Year j budgeted ASMs} * {Year i gallons used /ASM – 
Year j gallons used/ASM}
Alaska Airlines
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2. Fuel Costs (b)
[Fuel (ASM) cost effect of the Productivity Component (i.e., lower costs due to higher passenger 
load factor)]
Variance = {Year j fuel cost/gallon} * {Year j gallons used/ASM} * {Year j budgeted ASMs – 
Year j actual ASMs}
3. Passenger-related costs
[Passenger-related cost effect of the Productivity Component (i.e., lower costs due to higher 
miles per passenger)]
Variance = {Year j cost/passenger} * {Year j budgeted revenue passengers – Year j revenue 
passengers}
 The Capacity Underutilization Component
1. Flight-related costs (a)
[Changes in flight-related costs relating to unused capacities (i.e., higher unit costs to acquire 
capacity that is unused)]
Variance = {Year j actual ASMs – Year j RPMs} * {Year i cost/ASM – Year j cost/ASM}
2. Flight-related costs (b)
[Changes in flight-related costs of available capacities (i.e., lower underutilization due to 
decrease in available capacity)]
Variance = {Year i cost/ASM} * {Year i actual ASMs – Year j actual ASMs}
3. Flight-related costs (c)
[Changes in flight-related costs of used capacities (i.e., higher underutilization due to decrease 
in capacity used)]
Variance = {Year i cost/ASM} * {Year j RPMs – Year i RPMs}
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